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Abstract
This econometric study takes a sumulation approach to investigate the impact of external
debt on economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries using a small
macroeconometric model estimated for 1970-1994. An important finding was the
significance of debt overhang variables in the investment equation, suggesting that
mounting external debt depresses investment through both a “disincentive” effect and a
“crowding out” effect.
Policy simulation was undertaken to investigate the impact of alternative debt stock
reduction scenarios (debt reduction packages of 5%,  l0%, 20% and 50%),  effective in
1986, on investment and economic growth in the subsequent years. It was found that
debt stock reduction would have significantly increased investment and growth
performance. A 20% debt stock reduction would, on average, have increased investment
by 18% and increased GDP growth by 1% during the 1987-1994 period.
Thus, the results demonstrate that debt forgiveness could provide a much needed
stimulus to investment recovery and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.
I. Introduction
The socioeconomic conditions in African countries deteriorated sharply during the 198Os,
a decade that is widely regarded as Africa’s “lost decade” of development opportunities.
Available empirical evidence shows that in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), per capita income
(measured by gross national product per person) declined at an average annual rate of
2.2%). Per capita private consumption fell by 14.8%; export volume was stagnant while
import volume plummeted at an average annual rate of 4.3%; and the terms of trade fell
by 9.1% (see Table 1). Using data on gross domestic product (GDP) instead of gross
national product (GNP) improves the picture marginally but the situation is still nothing
short of catastrophic. An analysis of Tables 2 and 3 confiis that between 1981 and
1990 the average annual growth rate of real GDP in sub-Saharan Africa was 1.7%. Given
the region’s high population growth rate, however, the average annual growth rate of
real GDP per  capita between 1981 and 1990 was -0.9%. Among all the regions constituting
developing countries, sub-Saharan Africa’s performance was the poorest, with the
exception of the Middle East and North African region.
Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa’s negative growth rate (-0.9%) contrasts sharply with
East Asia’s impressive real per capita GDP growth rate of 6.3% and China’s fantastic
growth rate of 8.2% during the decade. Nor did the economic performance of sub-Sabaran
Africa improve in the early years of the 1990s. From Table 3, it is confinned  that between
1991and 1993, SSA’s  growth rate of real per capita GDP was negative, averaging -2.3%
annually. In 1994, real per capita GDP remained negative at -0.7%. Only in 1995 did the
growth rate become positive, reaching 1.1%. This, of course, still fell short of the 8.0%
growth rate posted by East Asia and the 9.2% growth rate of real GDP per capita achieved
by China.
The bottom line is that the 600 million people inhabiting the 50-odd countries in sub-
Saharan Africa are among the poorest in the world. The World Bank classifies 74% of
the countries of SSA as “low-income economies” while the United Nations Development
Programme classifies 79% of them as “low human development” countries. Finally, out
of the 41 countries in the world classified as heavily indebted poor countries by the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, 33 (or 80%) are in sub-Saharan Africa.
(See Table 4.) Thus, the great majority of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not
only poor (regardless of the standards of evaluation) but also report low or negative rates
of growth of per capita income. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the income
gap between SSA countries and the rest of the world continues to widen.
A close examination of Table 3 shows that the relative position of SSA counties
started to deteriorate significantly in the 1980s when sub-Saharan Africa found itself in
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Table 1: Comparative economic indicators
Economic Indicators
Sub- L o w High
Saharan income income
Afr ica economies economies
1 . Growth of per capita GNP (%),  1980-89 -2.2




3 . Gross domestic savings as % of GDP, 1990 18
4 . Gross domestic investment as % of GDP, 1990 19
5. Growth of export volumes (annual %) 0.2
8. Growth  of import volumes (annual %) 4.3
7 . Change in tem-rs  of trade (%),  1985-90 -9.1
8 . Gross international reserves 2.3







Source: IMF,  World  Economic  Oub’ook  (various issues).
a quagmire of economic problems. The acute economic crisis of the last 15 years-
which resulted in the extremely poor growth performance-is attributable to a host of
factors, both internal and external. The internal factors are connected with domestic
macroeconomic policy weaknesses that have led to inflation, unemployment, rising fiscal
deficits and capital flight. The effects of domestic macroeconomic policy mistakes have
been exacerbated by structural weaknesses in the economies, particularly a narrow and
technologically backward production base and heavy dependence on the exportation of
a narrow range of primary products. The external factors reflect an increasingly hostile
international economic environment characterized by low and falling primary commodity
prices, declining terms of trade, soaring global interest rates, rising protectionism in the
industrialized countries, and dwindling capital flows into African countries that have
resulted in mounting current account and balance-of-payments deficits, and an escalating
external debt stock.
SSA’s  total external debt stock,*  which was US$84.049  billion in 1980, had jumped
to US$164.981  billion in 1988 and US$190.206  billion in 1990. By 1995, SSA’s  total
external debt stock amounted to US$223.298  billion (World Bank data). Note that between
1980 and 1995, the debt stock increased by US$139.249  billion or at an average annual
rate of 6.7%. Associated with the rising external debt stock has been a crushing debt
service burden. From a level of US$6.374  billion in 1980, the total debt service on long-
term debt rose to US$12.264  billion in 1990 and then dipped to US$8.784  billion in
1995 (due largely to reschedulings  and some amount of debt forgiveness). The debt
service ratio (measured by the ratio of actual debt service payments to exports of goods
and services), which was a mere 5.4% in 1970, jumped to 21.3% in 1985 before falling
to 14.7% in 1995. (See Table 5.)
One disturbing aspect of the macroeconomic management of sub-Saharan African
economies in the 1980s was their failure to respond favourably to the ministrations of
structural adjustment programmes (SAPS). Structural adjustment programmes were
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Table 2: Growth of real GDP. 1966-95
World total 5.1 3.4 3.2 1.2 2.9 2.8
Industrial countries 4.8 3.0 3.2 1.3 3.0 2.5
Developing countries* 6.9 5.0 3.3 4.6 4.6 4.9
East Asia 7.9 6.8 7.6 8.7 9.3 9.2
China 8.5 6.3 9.9 12.3 12.2 10.2
South Asia 3.7 4.0 5.7 3.2 4.7 5.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.7 3.4 1.7 0.6 2.2 3.8
Latin America & Car 6.4 4.8 1.7 3.2 3.9 0.9




Source: ILO.  World Employment 1996.
l Excluding Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.




World total 1.2 -0.4 1.2 1.4
Developed countries 2.2 0.7 2.4 1.8
Developing countries 1.2 2.6 2.7 3.2
East Asia 6.3 7.2 7.6 8.0
China 8.2 11.0 10.5 9.2
South Asia 3.1 1.1 2.7 3.6
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.9 -2.3 -0.7 1.1
Latin America & Caribbean -0.5 1.3 2.0 -0.7
Middle East & North -3.0 0.7 -2.2 0.1
Source: ILO, World Employment 1996.
1995
1995
recommended by the World Bank and IMF as an antidote to the economic crisis brought
on by the debt crisis, among other factors. Structral adjustment was presented as a
programme that would restore stabilization in the short term and facilitate sustainable
growth in the medium to long term  Accordingly, a majority of SSA countries adopted
SAPS in the 1980s. Unfortunately, in virtually all sub-Saharan African countries, SA has
meant a period of austerity, declining income and living standards, mounting
unemployment, and increasing poverty (ILO, 1996). Devaluation, which featured in
virtually all SAPS,  led to an increase in total debt and debt service payments denominated
in domestic currency. The deflation required by the SAPS led to a fall in domestic product
and a reduction in national income available for consumption, provision of public services
and investment. A reduction in investment meant a fall in economic growth. Meanwhile,
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materialize, due to a lethal combination of political instability, poor macroeconomic
policies, weak economic performance and the debt overhang syndrome. In addition,
heavy debt service payments have been shown to also “crowd out” foreign investment.
Indeed, aid and other foreign investment were routinely diverted into debt service
payments mainly to pay the multilateral institutions (World Bank and IMF) as debt owed
to the multilateral institutions cannot be rescheduled or written off (Kapijimpanga, 1996).
Besides, debt rescheduling by bilateral donors does not constitute true debt relief; it
leads to further build-up of debt stock as rescheduled debt often attracts higher interest
rates while the interest accumulated is capitalised.  “So, rescheduling has not solved the
African debt problem but rather intensified it” (Kapijimpanga, 1996: 14).
With the rapid build-up of external debt and the poor economic performance of the
domestic economies, sub-Saharan Africa’s debt crisis has deepened and the debt burden
has become even more crushing. Indeed, relative to exports and economic activity
(measured by the GNP),4  SSA’s  debt is the highest of any region in the world (Klein,
1987; Iyoha and Iyare, 1994; ILO, 1995). According to the IL0 (1995: 3),
Africa’s external debt is the highest in the world as a proportion of GDP; some
countries in the region are spending more than half of their export earnings to
service foreign debts. The debts of many African countries are so large in relation
to their foreign exchange earnings potential that it would be impossible to pay
them off even if growth resumed and was sustained at unrealistically high levels.
Largely as a consequence of debt servicing, flow of capital from Africa is
significantly more than flow of new capital to the region.
As a result of deterioration in the terms and conditions of SSA’s  debt in the 1980s
sub-Saharan Africa’s debt export ratio (measured as the ratio of debt outstanding and
disbursed to exports of goods and services) doubled between 1980 and 1985, when it
rose from 78.6% to 173.3%,  and almost doubled again between 1985 and 1991 when it
further increased to 329.4%. (See Table 5 and FigureA2.) The ratio of actual to scheduled
debt service payments of SSA countries deteriorated during the 1980s-falling  from 66%
in 1983 to 47% in 1989. Between 1989 and 1995, the average ratio of actual debt service
due was 58.9%. (See Table 6 and Figure A4.) Further evidence of debt distress is found
in the fact that in 1986, 27 of the 44 countries in Africa had payments arrears. Also,
between 1986 and 1987,23 SSAcountries  renegotiated their official bilateral debt through
the Paris Club. In the mid 1980s  30 SSA countries were officially classified as “debt
distressed” (Klein, 1987). In the 1990s  33 SSA countries have been classified as heavily
indebted poor countries (World Bank, 1996). Finally, the huge burden of SSA debt
constitutes a serious obstacle to employment creation and growth as “investment resources
for productive pursuits are consistently used to meet external debt service obligations”
(ILO, 1995: 3).
These two issues-debt and lack of growth-are clearly interrelated. Indeed, all
indications are that the excessive stock of external debt is retarding the growth and
hampering the socioeconomic development of SSA countries. The large debt stock and
crushing debt service burden have now introduced a new “vicious circle” to the analysis
6 RESEARCH PAPER 90































EDT/XGS DOD/XGS  EDT/GNP DOD/GNP TDS/XGS RES/MGS RES
("W w W) c-w ("W (months) (US$m)
91.0 63.2 20.5 14.3 5.4
105.8 73.5 24.2 16.8 6.2
113.0 76.2 20.0 13.5 7.0
106.9 70.0 22.6 14.8 8.8






93.7 61.6 24.3 16.0 5.8 3.4 7,908
98.1 64.7 24.5 16.2 5.8 3.1 7,696
98.6 64.3 25.6 16.7 4.8 2.4 7,475
138.4 92.4 28.9 19.3 7.1 1.6 5,407
129.8 85.2 30.7 20.2 7.1 3.0 10,215
119.7 78.6 30.6 20.1 7.8
143.4 108.4 28.7 21.7 10.3
199.7 152.9 32.0 24.5 15.0
259.2 197.2 42.2 32.1 20.3






227.9 173.3 55.1 41.9 21.3 1.7 6,519
223.7 183.2 56.2 46.0 22.0 1.8 7,075
244.1 199.7 64.3 52.6 18.4 1.9 8,090
242.9 198.9 67.2 55.2 20.7 1.5 10,378
237.7 195.4 69.1 56.8 17.9 1.7 12,129
225.7 183.9 70.8 57.7 17.8 2.0 15,597
239.4 195.8 70.6 57.7 16.4 2.3 18,054
235.6 188.7 69.8 55.9 15.7 1.8 14,280
251.9 195.2 73.2 56.7 14.9 1.9 15,310
265.7 206.4 78.7 61.1 14.0 2.1 20,107
269.8 210.5 74.1 57.8 14.7 n.a. n.a.
= total external debt stock
= exports of goods and services
= total debt outstanding and disbursed
= gross national product
= total debt service
= international reserves
= imports of goods and services
Source: Computed from World Bank, World Debt Tables (various issues).
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Average 12,746.7 21,644.g 58.9
Source:  World Bank (1996).
of the development problem of SSA. In many sub-Saharan African countries, debt
servicing in the face of inadequate foreign exchange earnings leads to severe import
strangulation. Import strangulation holds back export growth, thus perpetuating import
shortages. The debt overhang and other uncertainties created by the debt situation further
depress investment. Falling investment combined with shortages of essential imports
results in declining real output. Declining output and escalating current account deficits
lead to increasing debt and rising debt service obligations.
It seems incontestable that given the structural weakness of most SSA economies,
their low income, low savings and low investment, the current high levels of debt and
debt servicing would militate against rapid economic growth and development. Indeed,
analysts and international policy makers appear to have reached a consensus to the effect
that a satisfactory recovery of investment and output growth in indebted SSA countries
will remain difficult, perhaps unattainable, as long as they are saddled with a burden of
debt servicing that requires a sizeable  net transfer of resources abroad. Stated simply,
there is no way in which many SSA countries can service their debt and still have adequate
resources left for development finance. Thus, many now believe that a necessary condition
for economic growth and development in SSA is debt relief. This must go beyond debt
reschedulings  and even beyond the “Naples terms” (the latest initiative by executive
countries). It could be a policy package that combines debt reduction (debt or debt service
write-down) with a significant amount of debt forgiveness (write-off of official debt and
perhaps write-down of commercial debt) for the low-income SSA countries.
This econometric study uses a simulation approach to investigate the impact of external
debt on economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries. In particular, it undertakes
policy simulations (using alternative debt stock reduction scenarios) to analyse the effect
of debt on investment and output in SSA countries between 1987 and 1994.
In addition to this introduction, the study contains four other sections. The next section
offers a discussion of the scope, nature and severity of the debt crisis in sub-Saharan
Africa. Section III presents a specification, estimation and discussion of an econometric
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model of external debt and economic growth for SSAcountries.  The basic model consists
of two stochastic equations explaining output and investment, and two identities (a capital
accumulation identity and a debt accumulation identity). The simultaneous equation model
is estimated by the two-stage least squares technique. The model is dynamically simulated
in Section IV which includes a discussion of the results of historical simulations carried
out for the 1971-1994 period and policy simulations perfomled  over the 1987-1994
period. The policy simulations involved assessing the impact of alternative debt stock
reduction scenarios (effective in 1986) on investment and output in the 1990s. The last
section contains policy recommendations, a summary and some concluding remarks.
II. External debt of SSA countries: Scope,
nature and severity- - - -
In order to fully understand the debt crisis of sub-Saharan African countries, this section
first presents the background of the debt crises, and then analyses the scope, nature and
severity of SSA’s external debt.
Genesis of the debt crisis
The external debt crisis of sub-saharan Africa is best understood when considered as an
integral part of the global debt crisis that emerged in 1982. The global debt crisis arose as
a result of:
l over-borrowing by the developing countries and reckless lending by international
commercial banks in the 1970s
l the collapse of world commodity prices (including especially petroleum) in the
early 1980s
l the sharp increase in international interest (lending) rates in 1982
The phenomenal increase in foreign borrowing that preceded the debt crisis was
triggered by the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979, which resulted in acute current account
deficits in most non-oil producing less developed countries. These countries resorted to
foreign borrowing to tide them over the problems raised by the internationally generated
shocks to their balance of payments. At the same time, during the period following the
oil price hike of November 1973, the international commercial banks were awash with
“petro dollars” that they were anxious to recycle. Thus the needs of the cash-strapped
developing countries and the excessively liquid international financial institutions seemed
to complement each other and loans were liberally, if not recklessly, approved. Things
appeared to go on smoothly for some years as the debts of these countries were rolled
over as they fell due. However, the era of easy availability of credit came to a sudden
end with the global financial crisis of 1982. This financial crisis was precipitated by the
collapse of oil prices and the sharp increase in interest rates that led to the Mexican debt
default. The immediate effect of the financial crisis was that developing countries debts
could no longer be rolled over-debtor countries could only service their debts by increasing
exports or reducing imports. Many debtor countries in the developing world were ill-
prepared for the required belt tightening. Nor were world trade conditions conducive to
any significant increase in these nations’ export earnings. The crisis was further aggravated
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by the actions of the international banks who belatedly scrambled to cover dangerously
exposed positions. This was the genesis of the global debt crisis, which saw a real fear of
the falling “domino effect” resulting in massive defaults by the highly indebted countries
of Latin America. Such an eventuality would certainly have shaken the international
financial system to its very foundations and possibly led to a global depression.
The external debt of sub-saharan African countries witnessed a rapid build-up during
the period immediately following the global debt crisis with external debt obligations
skyrocketing from US$84 billion in 1980 to US$223.3 billion in 1995. (See Table 7 for
details.) Thus, SSA’s  external debt stock increased by 265.8% in 15 years, i.e., it grew at
an average rate of 6.7% per annum.
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The sharp external debt build-up in the post 1989 period is attributable to several
factors, including:
. continued decline in the terms of trade
. uncontrolled fluctions in export earnings
. higher interest rates
. realignment of exchange rates
. rescheduling and refinancing of SSA’s external debt, which only served to increase
the debt stock
Thus, it would be erroneous to attribute the current debt crisis in sub-Saharan Africa
to purely wasteful and unproductive expenditures by these countries. The fact is that a
significant proportion of the increase in SSA’s external debt since 1982 can be attributed
to exogenous factors largely beyond the control of the countries. Indeed, the doubling of
SSA’s external debt stock in the 1980s took place against the background when the
countries borrowed virtually no additional money for productive investment and the
meagre borrowings were directed mainly to debt service and occasionally to the
maintenance of minimal import requirements5 Many analysts have pointed out that the
rapd build-up in external debt in the 1980s occurred notwithstanding the sharp cutback
made in their expenditures and the tenacious implementation of futile economically ad
socially debilitating IMF/World  Bank inspired structural adjustment programmes (SAP S).
Despite the adoption of SAPS by most SSA countries, there was a sharp fall in the real
net resource flows especially from the IMF and the IBRD (World Bank) during the 1980s.
(See Table 8. ) Besides, the implementation of SAPS  has led to the sacrifice of the
medium-to long-term objectives of growth in SSA countries (Iyoha, 1991b; UNECA,
1989).
Several factors have brought the issue of external debt to the forefront of the problems
facing the SSA countries. They include:
a) the rapid rise of the stock of external debt, especially since 1982
b) the deterioration in the terms and conditions of debt caused partly by changes in
the composition of debt but mainly by the rise in interest rates
c) the rapid increase in debt servicing obligations arising from (a) and (b)
d) the emergence of debt servicing problems including risk of default and loss of
credit worthiness
e) the stubborn problem of debt overhang
f) the adverse effects of (a)-(d) on the growth prospects of SSA countries
It is now generally agreed that the combined effects of (a)-(e) and a sharp fall in the
real net resource flows since the early 1980s have had a debilitating impact on the
economies of SSA countries. Most of the economies have shrunk during this period and
there has been a significant decline in the standard of living. Real per capita incomes in
SSA coutries  were on the average lower at the end of the 1980s than at the beginning.
See Figure 1 for graph of GNP per capita between 1970s and 1994 and Figure 2 for a
graphical representation of SSA’s real GDP during the period under study. In addition,
consequent to the collapse of investment, a large part of SSA’s infrastructure has
disappeared and gains made in education, health and nutrition during the previous decades
have been dissipated.
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1980 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1985 1 9 8 6 1987
1 2 1 7 1618 9 5 2
4 8 7 7 3 9 9 9 3
7 3 0 8 7 9 -41
4 2 4 6 3 7 7 7 8
21 4 4 5 6
4 0 3 5 9 3 7 2 2
4 0 0 7 0 8 8 3 2
3 2 8 4 3 8 5 2 7
7 2 2 7 0 3 0 5
1205 1 7 4 2 9 8 6
7 0 7 6 8 4 4 4 2
1 6 5 7 2 2 9 5 1925
2818 2 7 0 -1667
5 6 5 7
5 8 4 3
4 0 9 2
6 6 0 6
1 7 2 7
4 4 6 0
738 735
1172 1 6 8 9
-434 -954
881 1400
7 9 9 4
802 1306
6 4 7 8 9 8




4 7 2 1 2 1 0
-2648 -1132
- 8 5 6  2 0 6 7






1 5 7 0
1 9 8 8 1989
1 0 3 3  8 6 5
1495 1593
-462 -728
1 6 9 7  1 7 0 0
128 126
1 5 6 9  1 5 7 4
9 9 8




1 3 0 6  1 2 2 6
-725 -391
382 455
7 0 9 672 607
1194 6 3 0 9 4 5
-213 -434  -428
3185 1 7 1 2  2 3 0 7
7 6 2 6 7 9 7 3  9 4 2 0
Source: Derived from World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1990-91,  pp. 130-l 33.
l Purchases l * Repurchases and charges
l ** Publicly guaranteed and unguaranteed, excluding direct foreign investment
+ Excluding grants
Scope of SSA’s external debt
Since 1970, there has been a pronounced upward trend in the external debt stock of SSA.
(See Table 7 for data on level and growth of SSA’s external debt from 1970 to 1995.)
From a level of US$8.3  billion in 1970, SSA’s total external debt stocks increased rapidly
to US$22.7  billion in 1975. During this period, external debt grew at an average annual
rate of 22.55%. The highest annual growth rate of 35% was recorded in 1973. The growth
in external debt was even more rapid during the next five years. Between 1976 and 1980,
the average annual rate of growth of total external debt amounted to 30.4%. The highest
annual growth rate during this period was 5 1.5%,  which was reported in 1980. With total
external debt at the alarming level of US$84  billion in 1980, the rate of growth of the
debt moderated. Thus, between 198 1 and 1985, the average annual growth rate of external
debt was a mere 3%. The next two years witnessed a renewed upsurge in the growth of
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external debt with a growth rate of 32% in 1986 and 30% in 1987. In 1987, total external
debt stock stood at the alarming level of US$162.6  billion. Since 1988, the annual growth
rate of external debt has been 7% or less, except in 1990 when it jumped to 11.1%.
Despite the moderate growth rate in the 199Os,  however SSA’s total external debt stood
at the astronomical level of over US$223  billion in 1995.
During the decade of the 1980s  despite a reduction in the tempo of its growth, the
external debt of SSA increased faster than that of all developing countries (Iyoha  and
Iyare, 1994).
Structure and composition of SSA’s debt
Compared to Latin America, Africa depends more on official borrowing and less on
commercial borrowing from the international banks. According to Klein (1987: 12)
Official debt dominates the external obligations of most African countries. Only
five sub-Saharan African countries-Congo, Cote d’Ivoire,  Gabon, Nigeria and
Zimbabwe were  more to commercial banks than to official creditors.
However, while available empirical evidence shows that there was a shift in the source
of Africa’s external finance during the 198Os,  that of SSA has hardly changed. official
bilateral and multilateral loans still account for the bulk of SSA’s external debt. According
to the World Bank (1996a: 170),
Seventy percent of outstanding debt at the end of 1995 was owed to official
creditors-90 percent if Nigeria and South Africa are excluded. The region is a
major recipient of inflows, most on concessional terms, from multilateral
institutions. Thirty percent of long-term debt outstanding at the end of 1995 is
owed to the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the
African Development Bank and Fund.
Available World Bank data also show that sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, receives
the largest share of official development assistance (ODA). Indeed in 1994, ODA
constituted 12.4% of SSA’s GNP. This percentage is far above that of other low- and
middle-income regions. For the Middle East and North Africa, official development
assistance was only 1.6% of GNP; for South Asia, ODA comprised only 1.4% of GNP,
for East Asia and Pacific, ODA was a mere 0.8% of GNP; and ODA was only 0.3% of
GNP for Latin America and Caribbean and for Europe and Central Asia (World Bank,
1996b: 193). In quantitative terms, ODA flows to SSA reached US$16.9  billion in 1995
(up from US$15.4  billion in 1994) (World Bank, 1996a: 170). Nevertheless, since the
outbreak of the debt crisis, there has been a tendency for the middle-income countries in
sub-Saharan Africa to depend slightly more on commercial (private) external finance
than was previously the case. Table 9 gives data on the structure and composition of
SSA’s external debt-by maturity and type of creditor, while Figures Al and A3 provide
graphical illustrations. In the second half of the 198Os,  loans from the multilateral agencies,
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particularly the IMF, began to dry up. By 1989, net transfers from both the IMF and
World Bank (IBRD) had become negative. This means that sub-saharan  African countries
were, on a net basis, transferring resources to the Bretton  Woods institution. (See Table
8 for the relevant data.) Since many sub-Saharan African countries are low income
countries, IDA disbursements have remained relatively buoyant. IDA disbursements
actually jumped from US$424  million in 1980 to US$1.700  million in 1989.
The share of long-term debt in the total external debt of SSA rose from 77.4% in
1980 to a peak of 85% in 1987; thereafter it declined slightly but steadily, reaching
83.8% in 1991. The share of short-term credit in total external debt fell from 17.2% in
1980 to 12.5% in 1991, while the share of IMF finance in SSA’s  total external debt
declined from 5.4% in 1980 to 3.7% in 1991. SeeFigureAl  for adiagrammatic illustration.
The severity of the debt problem
The severity of SSA’s  problems is best appreciated by undertaking a comprehensive
analysis of debt indicators. Debt indicators or debt ratios are measures of debt burden.
They can be used as analytical tools or for policy purposes; they may also be used for
descriptive or predictive purposes (Nowzad and Williams, 1981). As a descriptive measure,
external debt indicators provide in an understandable and functional way a history of the
terms, structure and scale of past borrowing. They may therefore be used in intertemporal
analysis to examine the level and rate of change in debt capacity and debt service capability.
In the analysis that follows, primary emphasis is placed on an examination of the two
most important debt indicators, the debt ratio and the debt service ratio. Other commonly
used debt indicators include:
. the ratio of amortization payments to disbursements
. the ratio of interest payments to export earnings
. the ratio of net resource transfer to GDP (or the associated concept,
the ratio of net flow to GNP)
. the net external debt ratio
. the ratio of international reserves to total external debt
. the ratio of international reserves to debt service payments
. the ratio of actual debt service payments to scheduled debt-service payments
Table 5 presents data concerning the key debt indicators for sub-Saharan Africa during
the 1970-1995 period and Figure A2 provides a graphical illustration. The debt ratio is
conventionally measured by the ratio of total external debt to GDP or total external debt
to export earnings of goods and services .6  The debt service ratio is conventionally
measured by the ratio of debt-service payments to exports of goods and services. An
examination of Table 5 shows that the ratio of external debt (EDT) to GNP increased by
50%, from 20.5% to 30.7%,  between 1970 and 1979. In the 1980s  Africa’s “lost decade”
of development opportunities, GNP declined. With external debt growing faster than
GNP, the ratio of external debt to GNP increased sharply. SSA’s  debt/income ratio doubled
in five years, rising from 28.7% in 1981 to 56.2% in 1986. Though moderating somewhat,
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the debt/income ratio continued to rise in the late 198Os, reaching 70.8% in 1990. The
1990s witnessed a continued increase in the debt/income ratio, which peaked at 78.7%
in 1994 before dipping to 74.1% in 1995.
The story told by the ratio of debt (measured as total debt outstanding and disbursed)
to GNP is similar, though slightly more serious. While the EDT/GNP ratio increased by
361.5% between 1970 and 1995, the DOD/GNP ratio increased by 404.2% during the
same period. In SSA countries, debt grew more rapidly than exports during the period
under study. Thus, the debt/export ratio rose sharply during the period. The ratio of EDT
to exports increased by 296.5% during the period, rising from 91% in 1970 to 269.8% in
1995. The ratio of DOD to exports rose by 333%, from 63.2% in 1970 to 210.5% in
1995. The debt service ratio, measured as the ratio of total debt service payments to
exports of goods and services, rose from 5.4% in 1970 to 22.0% in 1986 before falling to
14.7% in 1995. Specifically, the debt service ratio doubled in the 197Os,  rising from
5.4% in 1970 to 10.3% in 1981. It doubled again between 1981 and 1986, rising from
10.3% in 1981 to 22% in 1986. It remained rather steady between 1986 and 1988, and
has fallen ever since (as a result of debt restructuring, debt reschedulings  and debt/interest
forgiveness), reaching a level of 14.7% in 1995.
This decline in debt service payment hides more than it reveals. For many countries
in SSA that are poor, highly indebted and deficient in export earnings, there is often a
wide divergence between actual and scheduled debt service payments. Thus, there is
generally a significant difference between the ratio of actual debt service to export earnings
and the ratio of scheduled debt service to export earnings. (See Table 6.) It is the scheduled
debt to export earnings ratio that is the more accurate measure of pressure of debt service
on export earnings and on the economy. According to Kapijimpanga (1996: 12):
The external debt burden reflects itself in the inability of a country to meet its
debt service obligations (scheduled debt service) in relation to its foreign
currency earnings. In Eastern and Southern Africa, the respective figures for
this ratio during 1994 were Ethiopia 53%; Kenya 51%; Madagascar 53%;
Mozambique 91%; Tanzania 64%; Uganda 50%; Zambia 5 1% and Zimbabwe
26%. It is evident from these figures that debt is a serious problem for many of
these countries. Mozambique was supposed to pay 9 1% of its foreign exchange
earnings to service its external debt. In reality, simply because of lack of
resources, Mozambique only paid 23% during the year.
Thus, for SSA countries at least, the actual debt service to export ratio grossly
underestimates the true nature of the debt burden and the debt crisis. The ratio of
international reserves to total external debt, which reached 27.3% in 1980, collapsed
during the period-falling to a low of 6.3% in 1988 but recovering slightly to 8.2% in
1994. The reserve/import ratio also deteriorated, falling from 3 months in 1980 to a low
of 1.5 months in 1988 and recovering to 2.1 months in 1994.
In sum, it seems clear that without any exception there was a deterioration in all the
debt indicators during the period under study. The debt burden increased, while the debt
service capacity deteriorated. Countries of sub-Saharan Africa are heterogeneous in size,
16 RESEARCH hPER 90
Table 9: The composition of Sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt, 1990-95 (US$  billion)
Year EDT
Long - ten-n  debt Use of IMF Cr Short-term debt
P&PG PNG Total % of Amount % of Amount %of
total tow totat
1980 84.0 53.8 4.8 58.4 69.5 3.0 3.6 22.6 26.9
1988 165.0 130.7 4.8 135.5 82.1 7.0 4.3 22.5 13.6
1989 171.2 135.7 5.0 140.7 82.2 6.4 3.7 24.1 14.1
1990 190.3 149.8 5.3 155.1 81.5 6.6 3.5 28.6 15.0
1991 194.8 154.0 5.4 159.4 81.8 6.6 3.4 28.8 14.8
1992 192.8 149.3 5.1 154.4 80.1 6.4 3.3 32.0 16.6
1993 197.9 148.3 5.1 153.4 77.5 7.0 3.5 37.5 19.0
1994 212.4 159.5 5.6 165.1 77.7 7.9 3.7 39.4 18.6
1995 223.3 167.5 6.8 174.3 78.1 7.2 3.2 41.8 18.7
Source: World Bank, World  Debt Tables, various issues.
Table 10: Comparative debt indicators, 1990-95
Debt to export ratio (%)
Share of 1995
Country group total debt 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995”
All developing countries 100 161.6 175.3 166.7 168.6 162.8 150.0
By region
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & the Pacific
South Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
1 1 225.7 239.4 235.6 251.9 265.7 269.8
23 106.6 106.0 101.6 101.3 93.3 83.3
8 315.9 311.7 319.4 287.9 271.6 245.7
18 120.2 157.8 143.6 151.5 153.7 144.6
29 277.4 282.0 276.2 274.6 258.6 254.2
1 1 109.8 129.2 126.1 134.5 148.5 136.9
Highly indebted poor countries 1 1 489.2 529.9 531.8 561.3 526.3 565.4
Source: World Bank (1996).
Based on (nominal) debt stock at year-end.
a. Preliminary
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income, total external debt owed, debt service obligations and hence debt burden. The
impact of debt on the different economies has thus varied. While some countries have
managed to stay afloat, many are on the brink of collapse.
Consider the following facts: in 1986, “27 out of the 44 countries” in SSA had payments
arrears (Drouin, 1989: 3); between 1982 and 1987, “27 sub-Saharan African countries
have renegotiated their official bilateral debt through the Paris Club” (Klein, 1987: 10).
Note that while the aggregate SSA debt/GNP ratio was 97.1% in 1988, that of Madagascar
reached 192%,  that of People’s Republic of Congo was 205% and Mozambique’s was a
crushing 375% (Iyoha, 1996: 11). Klein (1987) has further pointed out that some low-
income African countries have been unable to repay debt rescheduled with a standard
ten-year maturity, even with a five-year grace period. Increasingly, many SSA countries
are being compelled to reschedule already rescheduled debt, and being forced to borrow
to pay interest on past borrowing, thus escalating total debt and falling deeper into the
debt trap.
The severity of the debt crisis in SSA may be better appreciated when it is realized
that since 1982, external debt has been escalating at a time of massive decline in export
revenues and dwindling capital inflows. According to Drouin (1989: 3) “over the last
decade, the foreign debt burden of the [SSA] region grew worse than that of any other
category of country facing debt servicing problems”. According to Gon9alves  (1996: 5),
‘The devastating impact of debt on the fragile African economies can easily be illustrated
by revelations that Uganda, for example, spends only US$3  per person on health compared
to US$17  per person on debt payments. From 1990 to 1993, Zambia spent 35 times more
on debt payments than it did on primary school education”. Indeed, relative to exports
and economic activity, SSA’s debt is among the highest of any region in the world (Iyoha
and Iyare, 1994). Table 10 presents data on debt indicators for developing countries by
region. It is easily verified that in the early 199Os,  SSA’s  debt to export ratio was higher
than that of any region except Latin America and the Caribbean. However, by 1995,
SSA’s  debt to export ratio of 269.8% was the highest of any region. Notice also that in
1995, the debt to export ratio of the highly indebted poor countries, 80% of which are in
sub-Saharan Africa, was an astronomical 565.4%.
The fiscal dimension of the debt burden also needs to be highlighted. Given that the
composition of debt is heavily tilted to the public domain, responsibility for debt service
also falls heavily on the public sector. The heavy debt service payments have inevitably
put great pressure on budgets, leading to rising fiscal deficits in the highly indebted
countries. Several problems arise. The first is that taxes need to be increased in order to
raise the resources (in domestic currency) to service the debt. One  of the consequences
of the anticipated tax burden is to depress investment-the debt overhang effect. Second,
it is necessary to transform the domestic resources to foreign exchange in which debt
service must be paid. The desperate demand for foreign exchange to service debt often
results in aid resources being routinely diverted to finance debt service payments. Third,
the stiff demand of high debt service payments on the budget results in forced reductions
in public investment and also reduced spending on education and health. The “diversion”
of resources from public investment to debt service payments is related to the “crowding
out” hypothesis. Thus, pressures of debt service payments have relevance for the fiscal
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sustainability of debt in addition to the sustainability of high investment as demonstrated
in the debt overhang and “crowding out” hypotheses. Certainly, the brutal pressure of
debt service payments on the budget explains not only the escalating budget deficits but
also the increasingly large discrepancy between actual and scheduled debt service
payments in many SSA countries. Thus growth is likely to be retarded because of the
depressing effect on investment of heavy debt service payments and the reduction of
growth-supporting government expenditures.
As matters now stand, sub-Saharan African countries are constrained to use
approximately 20% of their export earnings for debt servicing. Since the foreign exchange
earnings of many of these countries are inadequate to begin with, it is apparent that
reducing the already insufficient amount by 20% would leave grossly inadequate resources
for financing development.‘This  is why a UNECA (199 1: 10) study has concluded that:
It is increasingly clear that very little progress, if any, can be made in Africa
without the resolution of the debt crisis; and that there is no way in which
Africa can service its existing debt and still have resources left for development
financing.
There is a growing consensus among analysts, experts and researchers that there is
need to go beyond traditional debt-relief mechanisms, which include IMP and World
Bank loans and Paris Club8  reschedulings. ConsequenIy, in September 1999, the IMP
and Word Bank jointly introduced the IPC initiative, a program designed to reduce the
debt burden of eligible HIPCs  (highly indebted poor countries). However, it seems clear
that for highly indebted low-income countries in SSA, even the full use of traditional
debt-relief mechanisms and the HIPC initiative would continue to prove insufficient in
helping them achieve debt sustainability. As a result, many now believe that it is necessary
to go beyond the traditional debt-relief mechanisms if many SSA countries are to achieve
sustainable debt levels within reasonable time horizons. In particular, because of the
inadequate relief offered by debt reschedulings, some analysts now consider debt
forgiveness, i.e., debt cancellation, as the most appropriate way of reducing the debt
burden of heavily indebted low-income countries. According to Ogbe (1992: 29):
Debt forgiveness or cancellation is, no doubt, the most complete and effective
strategy of debt relief. The principal debt is not only extinguished but also the
steady accumulation of debt that comes from repeated debt rescheduling and
the resulting capitalization of interest and arrears are eradicated. Moreover, the
sizeable  administrative and financial burdens associated with periodic debt
rescheduling are also eliminated.
III. A model of external debt and growth in SSA
This section presents a small macro model that permits simulation of the effect of external
debt on economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries. The basic macroeconometric
simulation model consists of three equations, of which 2 are stochastic and one is an
identity. The two stochastic equations relate to the production function (output equation)
and an investment demand equation incorporating a debt overhang variable in addition
to a variable to capture the “crowding out” effect of debt service payments. The third
equation is debt accumulation identity.
The output equation
The inspiration for the output equation used in this study is neoclassical, tracing its roots
to Solow  (1957) who hypothesized that output depended on capital and labour inputs
and on disembodied technical change. It also owes much to the modifications introduced
by development economists, particularly Chenery and his associates (e.g., Chenery and
Strout, 1966),  which emphasized the role of investment and the investment-income ratio.
This combination is now becoming standard in the development literature and variations
of the model have been used by Oseghale and Amenikienan (1987),  Ram Rati (1985),
Mjema (1996),  Iyoha (1997a,  1997b),  Khan and Kumar (1993). In this study, it is
hypothesized that output depends on labour and investment per capita (used as a proxy
for capital stock). Thus, the output equation to be estimated econometrically using time-
series data is
In GDP = a, +u,lnL  + a,lnZ’CZ  + e, (1)
where GDP stands for gross domestic product and L stands for labour force. PC1  is
per capita gross domestic investment, In stands for natural logarithms, e,  is the random
error term assumed to be Gaussian white noise, a,>O  is the elasticity of output with
respect to labour  and a@  is the elasticity of output with respect to investment per head.
Equation 1 was estimated using the ordinary least squares regression method, the
MICROFIT  (MFlT  386) econometric software for PCs and data for 1970-1994. From
preliminary ordinary least squares regression calculations, it was found that the one-
period lagged value of PC1  gave better and more consistent results than its
contemporaneous value. It was therefore decided to use PCI,,  in place of PCI,. The
estimated output equation obtained was:
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Rz=0.964  - .i2-096 F(2,21) = 279
see = 0.03
Mean of Dependent Variable = 12.266
DW-statistic = 0.58
where t-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Given the value of
the  R2,  it can be concluded that the two independent variables (labour  and per capita
investment) together explain over 96% of the systematic variations in output during the
period being studied. The F value of 279 is highly significant, passing the significance
test at the  1% level. Thus, the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between
output and the two independent variables is validated. The signs of both coefficients are
correct and the t-values of the  two independent variables are highly significant; the t-
values of both coefficients pass the two-tailed test of significance at the 1% level. The
high significance of lnPCJl  suggests the existence of a distributed lag relationship. In
other words, investment affects output with a lag. The Durbin-Watson statistic is very
low, however, indicating the existence of positive first order serial correlation.
In attempting to correct for autocorrelation, we experimented with both first order
and second order autoregressive schemes using both the Cochrane-Orcutt method and
the Newton-Raphson iterative inverse interpolation method. The most satisfactory results
were obtained with a first order autoregressive scheme using the  Newton-Raphson method.
It converged after only seven iterations. The estimated regression equation was:
1nGDP  = 6.97 +.971nL  + O.O5lnPCZ~~, (3)
(11.1) (8.5) (1.62)
U,  = .89U,, (4)
(9.6)
R2  = 0.984 ii2 = 0.98
see = 0.02
Mean of Dependent Variable = 12.266
DW-statistic = 1.73
F(3,20) = 408
where, as before, t-values are reported below the coefficients. An examination of
Equations 3 and 4 confirms that we have improved on Equation 2. The serial correlation
has been eliminated as indicated by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.73. The fust  order
autoregressive parameter, P lies between zero and unity in absolute value. Its t-value is
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. With an R2  of 0.984, it is apparent that
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we are able to explain over 98% of the systematic variations in GDP by the two
independent variables. Both variables are correctly signed. Labour  force passes the
significance test at the 1% level. Investment fails the significance test at the usual 5%
level, but passes the test at the 10% level. The F-statistic of 408 is significant at the 1%
level. Thus the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between GDP and the two
regressors is validated.
Investment equation
Gross domestic investment collapsed in sub-Saharan  Africa in the 198Os,  especially
starting from 1983. According to World Bank data, from a level of US$44  billion in
1981, gross domestic investment rapidly fell to a low of US$23  billion in 1984. From
that level, it rose slowly, reaching US$37.6  in 1991. According to the World Bank (1994b),
the average annual growth rate of gross domestic investment was 5.1% between 1970
and 1980, but was -3% between 1980 and 1992. As may be expected, the investment/
GDP ratio also declined sharply. In analysing the movement of the investment/GDP
ratio, the World Bank (1992b) shows that while the annual average ratio was 21.5%
in19751979, it collapsed to 15.6% in 1980-1985.  Indeed, if the period 1983-1986 is
considered, it is found that the average investment/GDP ratio was only 13%. In fact,
from a ratio 26% of GDP in 1977, the investment ratio fell to a catastrophic 12.8% in
1984. No doubt, a fall in gross domestic saving partly accounts for this. World Bank
(1992b) statistics show that the ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP, which averaged
18.9% in1975-1979,  had fallen to 13.4% in198&1985.
Many analysts believe that the poor investment and growth performance of many
highly indebted less developed countries (including those in sub-Saharan Africa) since
the onset of the global debt crisis in 1982 can be attributed in part to the disincentive
effect of their external debt burden. This phenomenon is often referred to as the “debt
overhang” problem. The debt overhang hypothesis posits that the accumulated external
debt of these countries acts as a tax on future output and thus discourages private
investment. The theoretical case for debt overhang has been made by several authors,
including Dooley (1986),  Krugman (1988),  Sachs (1989),  Froot (1989) and Calvo (1989).
Some attempts have also been made to test the hypothesis empirically. Among these are
Sachs (1989),  Claessens (1990),  Borensztein (1990,1991),  Cohen (1990),  Warner (1992),
Degefe (1992),  Sawides (1992),  Chhibber and Pahwa (1994),  and Iyoha (1997a,  1997b).
Researchers like Sachs (1989) and Krugman (1988) have also analysed the “crowding
out” effect of debt service payments. This arises from the fact that many highly indebted
poor countries frequently divert resources, including foreign aid and other foreign
exchange resources, to take care of pressing debt service obligations, particularly debt
owed to the multilateral institutions, which is deemed “non-reschedulable”.
Borensztein (1990) provided a major and interesting attempt to test the debt overhang
effect empirically. Using data for the Philippines, he found that the debt overhang
hypothesis was largely valid. Specifically, he found that debt overhang had an adverse
effect on private investment. The effect was strongest when private debt, rather than
total debt, was used as a measure of debt overhang.
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Following Sachs (1988),  Krugman (1988),  Borensztein (1990),  Chhibber and Pahwa
(1994),  and Iyoha (1997a,  1997b),  we specify an investment demand function that has
its roots in neoclassical optimization theory. We also make allowance for the potential
existence of both a debt overhang effect and a “crowding out” effect of external debt.
Finally, we allow for the possible existence of an “investment accelerator” effect. In the
specification, investment per capita is hypothesized to depend negatively on domestic
interest rate, positively on the marginal product of capital, negatively on the price of
investment goods, positively on growth in real GDP, negatively on the external debt-
income ratio and negatively on the ratio of debt service to exports. Thus, the basic
specification of the investment demand function is given by
PCGDZ = b,,  + b,r + bMpK +b$”  + b,GDPGR + b&D/Y)  + b6 (OS/x +u (5)
b, < 0, b,> 0, b3< 0, b, > 0, b,< 0, b6 < 0, where PCGDZ is per capita gross
domestic investment, r = interest rate (commercial lending rate), MPK = marginal product
of capital,*O  P = price of investment goods and GDPGR = growth rate of real output,
which is expected to capture the “investment accelerator” effect. D/Y is the ratio of
external debt stock to GNP, (which is the usual measure of debt overhang), DS/x  is the
ratio of total debt service payments to export of goods and services, which is expected to
capture the “crowding out” effect of external debt, and u is a stochastic error term assumed
to be Gaussian white noise.
Some researchers, including Borensztein (EN), have suggested that the debt overhang
effect is expected to be particularly strong when considering private investment and
private debt. This hypothesis could not be tested in this study due to the unavailability of
the requisite data .ll
From preliminary ordinary least squares regression calculations, it was found that the
partial regression coefficient of the price of investment goods (Pq  in Equation 5 was not
statistically significant and fluctuated in direction. This variable was therefore dropped
in the final equation. The one-period lagged values of the interest rate and the debt-GNP
ratio were also found to give better and more consistent results than their contemporaneous
values. It was therefore decided to use r,-,  in place of r, and DYR,eI in place of DYRt.  The
amended equation was then estimated by the OLS technique and the following results
obtained:
PCGDZ = - 123 + 3.5 Z,,  + 407 MPK + 2 GDPGR - .7  D/y,,  - 2.5 DS. (6)
(-1.8) (2.4) (3.6) (1.9) (-3.1) (-4.3)
R2=0.88  - .@-O&l F(5, 18) = 26
see = 9.49
Mean of dependent variable = 78.33
D-W statistic = 1.4
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In Equation 6, t-values are again given in parentheses below each coefficient. Judging
from the value of R2,  it can be concluded that the independent variables in this equation
explain over 87% of the systematic variations in per capita gross domestic investment
during the period under study. The F-value of 26 is significant at the 1% level, indicating
that there is a significant linear relationship between the independent variables taken
together and per capita investment. All the signs are correct except that of the interest
rate. Of the four correctly signed independent variables, three (MPK,  debt-income ratio
and debt service ratio) pass the significance test at the 1% level. The fourth variable,
growth rate of real GDP, misses the two-tailed test significance at the traditional 5%
level. It nevertheless passes the significance test at the 8% level. Thus, there is some
evidence of an “investment accelerator” effect, but it is not very strong. Since the debt
overhang variable (D/Y) and “crowding out” effect variable @S/X)  are highly significant,
there is clear evidence of both a debt overhang effect and a “crowding out” effect. Since
their signs are negative, as postulated, their effect is to depress the level of investment.
However, the D-W statistic shows evidence of serial correlation.
In attempting to correct for autocorrelation, we experimented with both first order
and second order autoregressive schemes using both the Cochrane-Grcutt  method and
the Newton-Raphson iterative method. The most satisfactory results were obtained with
a second order autoregressive scheme using the Newton-Raphson iterative method. It
converged after only nine iterations. The estimated regression equation was:
PCGDZ = -129 + 2.3TM,  + 45Oh4PK  + 1AGDPGR  - .6(D/Y),, - 2.0 (DdX)
(-1.8) (1.5) (3.4) (1.7) (-2.2) (-3.2)
(7)
U,  = .49  U,-,  - .32U,, (8)
(2.5) (-1.6)
R2=0.9 ii2 =0.86 F(7, 16) = 20.7
see = 9.11
Mean of dependent variable = 78.33
D-W statistic = 2.09
where t-values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. An examination of
Equations 7 and 8 confirms that we have improved upon Equation 6. The serial correlation
has been removed as indicated by a D-W statistic of 2.09. The second-order autoregressive
parameters, 6, and $2,  lie between zero and unity in absolute value. Their t-values are
significantly different from zero at the 2% level and at the 12% level, respectively. with
an R2 of 0.9, it is clear that we are able to explain 90% of the systematic variations in
SSA’s  per capita gross domestic investment by the five independent variables. All the
variables except interest rate have the correct signs but only three are significantly different
from zero, using traditional levels. MPK passes the significance test at the 1% level. The
debt-service ratio is also significantly different from zero, using a two-tailed test, at the
1% level. The debt overhang variable (D/Y) passes the significance test at the 5% level.
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The investment accelerator variable (GDPGR) only passes the two-tailed significance
test at the 10% level. The F-statistic of 20.7 is significant at the 1% level. Thus, the
hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between per capita investment and the five
independent variables is validated. A plot of actual and fitted values of per capita
investment is given in Figure 4.
The results offer a confirmation of the debt overhang hypothesis for SSA countries.
The debt overhang variable, proxied by the ratio of external debt to GNP,  is negative and
highly significant. The elasticity12  of investment with respect to the debt overhang variable
is -0.337. Thus, a 10% decrease in the debt-GNP  ratio results in a 3.37% increase in
investment per capita. This means that a debt reduction of 10% will lead approximately
to a 3% increase in investment. Notice that the debt-income ratio affects investment with
a lag. The effect of the combination of this lagged response of investment to changes in
the debt level and the lagged response of output to changes in investment (arising inter
aliu from the existence of gestation lags) means that the impact of a reduction in debt
stock on output will not be instantaneous. Rather, it will manifest after a tune lag of
about two years. Nevertheless, the effect of a debt reduction on the investment climate
and investors’ perceptions will be immediate.
The results also provide conftrmation of the existence of a “crowding out” effect in
SSA countries. The coefficient  of the crowding out effect variable, proxied by the ratio
of total debt service payments to exports of goods and services, is negative and
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The elasticity of investment with respect
to the crowding out variable is -0.335. Thus, a 10% reduction in the debt service ratio
would increase investment by approximately 3%.
Now, let us summarize the empirical results. We find, using econometric techniques,
that SSA’s  heavy external debt stock and debt service payments act to reduce investment
through both the debt overhang effect and the “crowding out” effect. There is evidence
of a distributed lagged response of investment to changes in the debt-income ratio (and
of a distributed lagged response of output to changes in investment). Thus, reductions in
debt stock will affect investment and output after some lag in time (rather than
instantaneously).
A simultaneous equation model of external debt and
economic growth in SSA
In order to make explicit allowance for interaction between external debt and economic
growth, a truly simultaneous equations model is now specified. In particular, the output
equation and investment demand function are now considered as a system of simultaneous
equations. The simultaneous equations system is given by these modified equations:
1nGDP  = a, + a,lnL + a,PCGDZ,  + U,,
PCGDZ = &, + &Tt-,  + &MPK + &lnGDP  +p,GDPGR
(9)
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where ul, and uzt  are stochastic error terms. In this system of equations, there are two
endogenous variables, In GDP and F’CGDI.  There are seven predetermined variables,
namely, lnL, in FCGDI,,,  r,.,,  MFK, GDFGR, (DZY),,  and DSZX. Using the order condition
of identification, it can be ascertained that both equations are over-identified. The two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression method can therefore be used to estimate the
equations of the model. I3 Given the identification status of the equations of the model,
econometric theory assures us that the resulting estimates of the structural coefficients
will be consistent and asymptotically efficient.
preliminary econometric estimation of our simultaneous equations model using the
two-stage least squares regression method showed that the output equation exhibited
serial correlation. It was therefore re-estimated with the instrumental variable technique
using the Cochrane-Grcutt iterative technique for removing first-order serial correlation
of the error. These final equations were obtained (where t-values are reported in
parentheses below the appropriate coefficients):





R2 =0.923 ii2 = 0.915 see = 0.027
D-W statistic = 1.76
Log of likelihood function = 50.17
PCGDZ= -1992.7 - 1.22T,,  - 95.8MPK  + 18l.lZnGDP
(-1.70) (-0.37) (-0.29) (1.61)
+ 2.38GDPGR  - 1.6OD/Y~~,  - 2.ODSXX
(2.22) (-2.66) (-3.24)
R2=0.90 E2 = 0.86 F(6, 17) = 24.9
see = 8.96
D-W statistic = 1.85
(12)
In order to test whether it makes much difference empirically which definition of
debt is used-total external debt stock (EDT) or debt outstanding and disbursed (DOD-
the system of equations was re-estimated using DOD/GNP instead of EDT/GNP as the
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measure of debt overhang. The estimated results using DOD instead of EDT (with t
values in parentheses under the coefftcients) were:
1nGDP  = 7.34 + .87 1nL + .09PCi t-, (13)
(22.3) (19.7) (3.2)
R2= 0.96 ii* = 0.956 F (2,21) = 250
see=o.o3
Mean of dependent variable = 12.26
D-W statistic = 0.78
PCGDI  = -2373.2 - 2.92Tt-,  - 232.2MPK + 218.71nGDP
( - 2 . 1 )  (-.88)  (-.71) cm
(14)
+2.33GDPGR  - 2.ODCD/$, - 1.53DUX
(2.31) (-3.1) (-2.34)
R2  = 0.909 iiz=  0.876 F (6, 17) = 28.2
see = 8.465
Mean of dependent variable = 78.33
D-W statistic = 1.84
A comparison of Equations 12 and 14 shows that the overall fits are about the same.14
The same variables, GDPGR, debt-income ratio and debt service ratio, are also significant
in both. Thus, there is little difference as to whether we use EDT or DOD as our measure
of debt. However, we choose to use EDT since it is a broader and more comprehensive
measure of external debt.
Debt accumulation identity
The model is closed with an identity, a debt accumulation identity. Given the knowledge
of the SSA debt situation, it was decided to use the following identity:
DTOTAL = (1 + AVINT) DTOTAL (- 1) - DSPAY (16)
where DTOTAL  = total debt, DSPAY = total debt service payments and AVINT =
average interest paid on debt.
IV. Simulation results
Historical simulation
An historical simulation, also called an ex post simulation, is performed over the estimation
period of a macroeconometric model. The main reasons for historical simulation are
model validation and evaluation. A comparison of the actual or historical series for the
endogenous variables with the simulated series for the same variables is often used to
test the validity of a macroeconometric model. This is because such a comparison allows
an analyst or policy maker to determine how well a macroeconometric model “tracks”
the economy and, specifically, how well each simulated data series tracks or approximates
the corresponding actual series. Measures used to test how closely a simulated series of
an endogenous variable tracks its corresponding historical series include:
. the root-mean-squared simulation error (rms)
. the root-mean-squared percent error
. Theil’s inequality coefficient, W
In this study, the root-mean-squared simulation error and Theil’s inequality coefficient
are used in addition to the correlation coefficient between the actual and simulated data
series. In order to achieve a more efficient simulation and obtain richer results, the number
of endogenous variables was increased to six by specifying an identity for the debt-GNP
ratio, the debt-service ratio and the lagged value of per capita investment.
Dynamic simulation was then undertaken using the micro TSP4.3 computer software.
Simulations for the six endogenous variables were obtained. These are the log of GDP,
per capita investment, total external debt, debt-GNP ratio, the debt-service ratio, and the
lagged value of per capita investment. The historical simulations for investment, output
and external debt are shown in Figures 3,4  and 5 respectively. Table 11 contains key
simulation statistics-correlation coefftcient,  root mean squared error and Theil’s inequality
coefficient (Q-for  the three key endogenous variables, viz., log of GDP, investment per
capita, and external debt. Notice that the values of U, Theil’s inequality coefficient, for
output, investment and external debt are very small, signifying a close fit between the
simulated and actual series. Also, the correlation coefficients between their simulated
and actual series are uniformly high, ranging from 93% to 98.6%.
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Investment per capita (US$)
Debt reduction option
10% 20% 50%
1987 58.02872 60.73594 66.15040 82.39377
1988 49.75667 52.71081 58.61908 76.34389
1989 52.50642 55.11606 60.33533 75.99316
1996 45.56657 48.24107 53.59008 69.63709
1991 53.68879 56.11893 60.97922 75.56010
1992 56.55009 58.92995 63.68966 77.96881
1993 64.01367 66.23949 70.69115 84.04608
1994 67.81478 69.93542 74.17669 86.90050
Averaae 55.99071 58.50346 63.52895 78.60543
Source: Author’s calculations, 1999






1987 12.35601 12.36081 12.37040 12.39917
1988 12.36377 12.36866 12.37844 12.40778
1989 12.39480 12.39933 12.40840 12.43559
1990 12.40485 12.40979 12.41969 12.44936
1991 12.43272 12.43709 12.44583 12.47205
1992 12.44378 12.44826 12.45721 12.48408
1993 12.48095 12.48501 12.49315 12.51757
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percentage reductions in debt stock, say greater than or equal to 2O%,  there is a significant
increase in the average level of GDP Specifically, if the debt stock is reduced by 20%,
average GDP would rise by approximately 1% while if the debt stock were reduced by
SO%, average GDP would increase by an impressive 3.7%. Note that between 1987 and
1994, the average recorded growth rate of real GDP in SSA was 2.1%. Adding 3.7% to
this figure, we get 5.8%. Therefore, the implication of our results is that if there had been
a 50% debt stock reduction in 1986, the average growth rate of real GDP in SSA during
the 1987-1994 period would have been a healthy 5.8% instead of the anaernic 2.1%
actually achieved (without debt stock reduction). Results obtained in this study are similar
to those obtained by Chhibber and Pahwa (1994) for Nigeria. In that study, which simulated
a 50% debt reduction for Nigeria, also starting in 1986. They found that during the 1987-
1991 period, GDP growth would have averaged 2.9% higher. Thus, with a 50% debt
stock reduction, Nigeria’s average GDP growth during the 1987-1991 period would have
been 7.28% instead of the recorded 5.18% (Chhibber and Pahwa, 1994).
It is necessary to re-emphasize that due mainly to the operation of the debt overhang
effect and the “crowding out” effect there would have been a substantial recovery of
investment and an increase in the growth of real output in SSA as a result of a significant
reduction in debt stock.”
V. Summary and conclusion
This study has presented a small macroeconometric model that facilitated simulations of
the impact of external debt on economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The complete
simultaneous equations model consisted of two stochastic equations (for output and
investment demand) and four identities. The four identities in the dynamic simulation
were for debt accumulation, the debt/GNP ratio, the debt-service ratio and the lagged
value of per capita investment. The simultaneous equations model was estimated by
two-stage least squares for the 1971-1994 period. It was found that there is a significant
debt overhang effect as well as a “crowding out” effect. In other words, the large stock of
external debt and heavy debt service payments have had a depressing effect on investment
in SSA.
Historical simulation was undertaken in order to assess the validity of the model. On
the whole, the model performed well with the simulated values of the two key endogenous
variables (investment and output) closely tracking their corresponding actual data series.
In this respect, Theil’s inequality coefficient of less than 0.06 was obtained for both
investment and output.
Policy simulation was also carried out. In particular, the effect of alternative debt
stock reduction packages (5%,  lo%,  20% and 50% debt reductions) effective in 1986
was simulated. It was found that the hypothesized debt reductions assumed effective in
1986, would have significantly increased investment and, to a lesser extent, GDP during
the subsequent period. Similarly, the various debt stock reduction scenarios would have
reduced, to corresponding degrees, total external debt stock, the debt/GNP ratio and debt
service ratio. The policy simulations showed that a 50% debt stock reduction would
have raised per capita gross domestic investment by over 40%, and increased GDP growth
by over 3%,  on average, during the 1987-1994 period. These results largely mimic those
obtained for Nigeria by Chhibber and Pahwa (1994) and by Iyoha (1997a).
Results obtained in this study confirm that an excessively high stock of external debt
depresses investment and lowers the rate of economic growth. Thus, heavily indebted
countries in sub-Saharan Africa need to articulate creative strategies for bringing about
debt reduction so that the high debt stock and associated crushing debt service burden
would not have such a negative impact on economic growth. Traditional debt relief
mechanisms currently being used by SSA countries include debt restructuring, debt
rescheduling, reduced debt servicing, debt buy-backs, interest rate options, and various
debt conversion schemes like the debt-equity swap. Overall, the effectiveness of these
techniques in significantly reducing the debt stock has been rather limited (Ogbe, 1992).
V. Summary and conclusion-________i_______l____-  --_~_ - _
This study has presented a small macroeconometric model that facilitated simulations of
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In this respect, Theil’s inequality coefftcient  of less than 0.06 was obtained for both
investment and output.
Policy simulation was also carried out. In particular, the effect of alternative debt
stock reduction packages (5%,  lo%,  20% and 50% debt reductions) effective in 1986
was simulated. It was found that the hypothesized debt reductions assumed effective in
1986, would have significantly increased investment and, to a lesser extent, GDP during
the subsequent period. Similarly, the various debt stock reduction scenarios would have
reduced, to corresponding degrees, total external debt stock, the debt/GNP ratio and debt
service ratio. The policy simulations showed that a 50% debt stock reduction would
have raised per capita gross domestic investment by over 40%,  and increased GDP growth
by over 3%,  on average, during the 1987-1994 period. These results largely mimic those
obtained for Nigeria by Chhibber and Pahwa (1994) and by Iyoha (1997a).
Results obtained in this study confirm that an excessively high stock of external debt
depresses investment and lowers the rate of economic growth. Thus, heavily indebted
countries in sub-Saharan Africa need to articulate creative strategies for bringing about
debt reduction so that the high debt stock and associated crushing debt service burden
would not have such a negative impact on economic growth. Traditional debt relief
mechanisms currently being used by SSA countries include debt restructuring, debt
rescheduling, reduced debt servicing, debt buy-backs, interest rate options, and various
debt conversion schemes like the debt-equity swap. Overall, the effectiveness of these
techniques in significantly reducing the debt stock has been rather limited (Ogbe, 1992).
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Figure 4: Investment equation
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Figure 8: Output under 75% debt reduction
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Notes
The Sub-Saharan African countries are Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
C8te d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion,
Rwanda, Sb Tome and Principe,  Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Total external debt stocks (EDT) consist of public and publicly guaranteed long-
term debt plus private non-guaranteed long-ten debt plus the use of IMF credit plus
estimated short-term debt. This is to be distinguished from debt outstanding and
disbursed (DOD), which is defined as the total debt outstanding and disbursed of
long-tern1  official concessional, official non-concessional and private loans. Long-
tern1 external debt is defined as debt that has an original or extended maturity of over
one year that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods and
services.
Total debt service (TDS) measures the debt service payments on long-term debt
(public and publicly guaranteed and private non-guaranteed), use of IMF credit, and
interest on short-tern1  debt.
According to the World Bank (1996b), sub-Saharan Africa’s net present value of
external debt amounted to 50% of GNP in 1994. This compares unfavourably with
the ratios for other low and middle income regions of the world: Latin America and
Caribbean, 39%; Middle East and North Africa, 32% ; East Asia and Pacific, 28%;
South Asia, 26%; and Europe and Central Asia, 25%.
There is some debate as to what variable should be properly used for nomlalization,
i.e., as the denominator of total external debt and debt service payments. Taking a
short-term  view, export of goods and services would appear to be the more appropriate
scalar  as it is the main source of foreign exchange resources that can be used to
service debt. However, taking a longer tern1 view, GDP seems to be the appropriate
scalar  since the foreign exchange constraint may be lessened by growth in the non-
traded sector provided prices are flexible (Nowzad and Williams, 198 1). Iyoha (1994)
argues for using different scalars for total external debt and debt service. According
to him, GDP should be used to nomralize  total external debt while export of goods
and services should be used as the denominator for debt service payments. Thus the
external debt/GDP ratio may be interpreted as a measure of “debt capacity” or “debt
burden” while the debt service/export ratio would be interpreted as a measure of
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“debt service capacity” or “debt service burden”.
6 This is why Goran Ohlin (1966) maintained that a poor country has no debt servicing
capacity at all. According to Ohlin, for low-income developing countries, debt service
competes with essential imports for foreign exchange earnings, which are insufficient
to begin with, and also competes with the investment needs of the country for savings,
which are often deficient and inadequate. Besides, high debt service ratios make the
country extremely vulnerable to pressures on its balance of payments, thus further
hampering the development effort.
7 The Paris Club of Creditors represents only government guaranteed creditors. Its
membership includes Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. These governments guarantee the export
activities of their nationals through their official Export Credit Agencies. The first
Paris Club meeting was held in 1956. Meetings are held to discuss repayment problems
and negotiate debt relief agreements for debtor nations.
The London Club of Creditors deals with uninsured and unguaranteed debts extended
by their commercial banks to nationals of debtor countries. Thus, the members of the
Club are commercial banks based in the industrialized countries. The first London
Club meeting was held in 1976. Meetings are called to discuss repayment problems
and conclude restructuring agreements with debtor nations.
8 All the empirical data used are supplied in the Appendix.
9 Following Borensztein (1990), we approximate MPK by the real average product of
capital multiplied by the relative share of capital in output. The capital stock and
MPK series used in the empirical work will be made available to readers on request.
10 Iyoha (1997a) also finds econometric evidence of a private debt overhang for Nigeria.
He finds that there is both a debt overhang and “crowding out” effect with respect to
private investment. Thus, the evidence is that heavy debt service payments “crowd
out”, i.e., reduces, not only public investment but also private investment.
11 Since this is a linear equation, the elasticity-at-the-mean of a given independent
variable is obtained as the coefficient of that variable multiplied by its mean and
divided by the mean of the dependent variable.
12 Two-stage least squares is a generalized instrumental variable technique. It is a
regression method for obtaining point estimates of structural coefficients by direct
estimation. Estimates of such coefficients are known to be consistent and
asymptotically efficient.
14 The estimated coefficients for the output equation in the two sets are identical because
the system is recursive.
The three measures are defined thus:
(1) rms  error = &I
(Y;-Y”,  )2
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(2) rms percent error = @q
(3) u =
1 5 A 50% reduction in debt stock is close to the effective debt reduction receivable by
eligible low-income highly indebted countries under the so-called “Naples terms”
agreed on in December 1994 by creditor countries. For more on this, see CBN (1996),
p. 10.
1 6 Note that the small macroeconometric model used in this study permits debt (or debt
stock reduction) to affect growth only via investment. A larger model would, in
addition, allow for a direct transmission channel from debt to growth. These direct
effects are linked to the impact of debt on growth supporting expenditures such as
human capital and on expenditures which enhance investment productivity. In such
a case, debt stock reduction would increase growth via a rise in investment and also
increase growth directly by inducing increased growth promotion expenditures.
Conceivably, then, such a specification would increase the impact of debt stock
reduction on economic growth.
17 There would also have been corresponding improvements in debt indicators.
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Source: World Bank (1996). African  Devekq)ment Indicators, 7994-95;
World Bank, WorkI  Debt Tables  7992.
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1970 70 16.7 15.5
1971 80 18.8 15.1
1972 80 19.5 16.8
1973 60 19.8 18.4
1974 loo 19.6 21.9
1975 110 23.3 16.6
1976 120 25.9 20.5
1977 130 26.0 19.5
1978 100 23.5 15.1
1979 90 21.0 16.7
1960 100 21.9 19.7
1981 100 22.0 13.0
1982 90 19.9 11.5
1983 60 15.8 10.8
1984 60 12.8 12.3
1985 60 13.1 13.1
1986 70 16.7 12.5
1987 50 15.9 12.6
1988 50 15.7 11.5










Source: World Bank. World Tables 7992;  African Development Indicators, 1994-95; Wor ld
Deve lopment  Repor t  1996.
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SSA: Capital stock and marginal product of capital
Year Cap i ta l  s tock ’
(US$ b i l l ion)
MPK”
1970 4 5 7 . 7 0.22809
1971 4 4 6 . 6 0.24140
1972 4 4 1 . 3 0.25243
1973 4 3 9 . 8 0.25159
1974 4 3 9 . 5 0.25482
1975 440.0 0.26677
1976 449.8 0.26456
1977 4 6 4 . 2 0.27571
1978 481 .l 0 .28132
1979 4 9 3 . 7 0.27380
1980 5 0 0 . 0 0.27350
1981 5 0 8 . 8 0.26829
1982 5 1 7 . 4 0.26394
1983 5 2 1 . 1 0.26348
1984 5 1 6 . 8 0.25781
1985 5 0 6 . 1 0.25548
1986 4 9 7 . 5 0.25572
1987 4 9 8 . 4 0.25334
1988 4 9 8 . 0 0.25680






5 0 0 . 8 0.25495
5 0 3 . 9 0.25007
5 0 6 . 5 0.24415
5 0 9 . 1 0.23988
Source: l Computed by the author using the CAPITL  sub-program
of TSP 4.3 using a 5% depreciation rate.
l * Computed by the author.
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SSA: External debt stock (EDT), total debt  outstanding and disbursed (DOD) and total debt
service (TDS) (US$  million)
-__~__
Year EDT DOD TDS
1970 8,296.0 5.781.4 522.9
1971 9,772.0 8,769.3 516.7
1972 11,235.0 7,571.0 648.8
1973 15,168.0 9,928.5 1,165.5
1974 19,340.o 12,558.l lJI46.5
1975 22,721.0 14,879.7 1,300.g
1976 26,996.0 17,807.5 1,476.2
1977 33,705.o 21968.3 1,554.0
1978 43,655.0 29,142.7 2,103.3
1979 55.485.0 '36,422.8 2,853.3
1980 84,049.o 58,208.O 3,977.7
1981 75,668.0 57,190.o 4,576.6
1982 81,946.0 62,393.0 5,235.0
1983 88,233.0 67,164.0 6,411.l
1984 88,866.O 68,046.O 7,885.l
1985 96,396.0 75,979.0 8,918.g
1986 127,145.O 104,116.O 8,975.0
1987 162,629.0 133,135.0 8,296.0
1988 164,981.0 135,476.0 10,974.o
1989 171,236.0 140,735.o 9,761.0
1990 190,260.o 155,088.O 12,264.0
1991 194,779.0 159,364.0 11,176.0
1992 192,781.0 154,439.0 10,862.O
1993 197,886.0 153,372.0 9,890.O
1994 212,416.0 165,048.o 9,315.0
1995 223,298.0 174,281.0 8,784.0
Source: World Bank. World Debt Tables, various issues; African Development Indicators, 1994-
9 5 .
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Source: World Bank: WorMDebt Tab/es  (variousissues); AnnualReports (variousissues).
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Figure Al : Composition of external debt
q Long-term debt Short-term debt
Figure A2: SSA: Debt indicators, 197&1995
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Figure A4: Ratio of TDS paid to TDS due
n Ratio of debt service paid to debt service due
